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The paper analyses the evolution of relative wages using individual
wage data, and the contribution of skills to productivity using firm-
level information from Hungary, 1986-99. Its main conclusion is that
skills obsolescence was, and still is, an important aspect of post-
communist transition. The data suggest a general rise in the returns
to education between 1989 and 1992. This, the paper argues, was just
a mirror image of the collapse of demand for unskilled labour in a
period of deep crisis when technological change was minimal, and
the forces of the market just started to work. When market institutions
were already at work, and modern technologies were implemented on
a massive scale, the general appreciation of education stopped but
the returns to experience continued to decline. Young and educated
workers are paid increasing wages and their skills are estimated to
yield higher productivity returns, especially in a modern environment.
By contrast, neither productivity nor wages grew for the older
cohorts of educated workers after 1992.4
1. INTRODUCTION
The basic measures of enrollment in education, completed classes, and the
population’s total work experience suggested, some ten years ago, that
Central and Eastern Europe's transition to the market economy would be
promoted by a valuable and transferable stock of human capital. Optimistic
and proud references to a 'highly skilled labour force' were repeatedly
made in government manifestos and the (early) country reports of
international organizations. Some less contented observers warned,
however, that the distortions of the school system and the peculiarities of
work-based skills may considerably reduce the value of the inheritance.
The socialist system put strong emphasis on technical skills as opposed to
business related disciplines on both the secondary and higher levels of
education. On the secondary level simple vocational training for manual
occupations had shares exceeding 50 per cent while upper secondary
education was severely undeveloped. (OECD 1993). A considerable part of
what workers and managers 'learned by doing' was how to deal with input
shortages, how to manage the inconsistencies of plan orders, how to make
transactions on the sellers' market – skills losing their value when the
economy is opened and the forces of the market begin to work. In addition,
new technologies were expected to appear 'overnight', shortly after the
liberalization of trade and FDI, leaving the older generation less time for
adjustment than had their Western counterparts.
Whether the skills acquired under communism can indeed be adapted to
the needs of the Western market economy, which itself depreciated many
old skills in the last two decades, is a question bearing prime importance
for the region's social peace and growth prospects even now. In 2001 the
median worker of the region had about 20 years of work experience. She or
he left the school in 1980, invested ten years to the acquisition of work-
based skills in a socialist state enterprise, thus she/he is still at risk of
transition-related skills obsolescence. What is at stake is more than a mild
decrease in the potential growth rate: a disappointed older generation with
a broken career, pushed out of better jobs, paid lower and lower wages
would be an outright loss to the society as well as a risk endangering the
completion of post-communist transition.
Most, albeit not all, empirical studies demonstrate that the older generation
was indeed devalued during the transition. In Poland Rutkowski (1996)5
and Puhani (1997) presented evidence of falling wage returns to
experience in 1987-92 and 1992-95, respectively. In the former
Czechoslovakia Vecernik (1995), Flanagan (1995), Chase (1997), and
Sakova (1998) observed steeply declining returns in early stages of the
transition and so did Kertesi and Köllő (1999) in Hungary, Steiner and
Bellmann (1995), Krueger and Pischke (1995), and Burda and Schmidt
(1997) in the former GDR.
No decline in returns was detected by Steiner and Wagner (1997) in their
female sub-sample but, as they called the attention, their results were
biased by a growing share of public sector employees within East
Germany's female labour force. Franz and Steiner (1999) estimated falling
returns for women but flat experience-wage profiles for men both before
and after the unification. (Their choice of controlling the wage equation for
tenure may have affected their pre-unification estimates because labour
turnover was particularly low in the GDR questioning the distinction
between general and firm-specific experience.) A recent paper using
retrospective data by Munich, Svejnar and Terrell (1999) observed no
change in the experience-wage profile in the Czech Republic between
1989 and 1996. While the MST survey is unique in providing longitudinal
observations (the respondents were asked to tell their 1989 earnings in
1997) the data are potentially subject to recall bias and, even if unbiased,
are difficult to compare with other sources for the exclusion of young
workers.
Did, then, the older generation lose during the transition? We believe it did
as suggested by the bulk of the literature: the comparable studies based on
cross-section data, focusing on the enterprise sector, using potential years
in work as a measure of experience unequivocally suggest decline in the
wage returns although they do show differences in the magnitudes and
time paths. Some of the seemingly contradicting results can be reconciled
with these findings if specification issues are taken into account.
Undoubtedly, some disturbing details remain – ones discouraging general
statements about the 'fate of older generations' but calling for further
empirical research.
In this paper we would like to clarify some of the unclear details using
large samples of Hungarian workers and firms observed over a long period
(Appendix 1). Cross section samples of about 100,000 individuals per
annum in 1986-99 allow the analysis of relative earnings in various sub-
groups and the study of interactions between education and experience.
We can also confront the results from Mincer-type earnings functions with6
estimates of the relative productivity of skill groups distinguished by
educational background and experience. This is rendered possible by the
availability of enterprise level data on skills, capital and output for a
restricted sample of medium-sized and large firms.
The earnings functions presented in Section 2 reveal two stages of
different character in the revaluation of human capital. The first stage
starting in 1989 and lasting until the low point of the 'transformational
recession' brought about a widening wage gap between skilled and
unskilled labour and falling returns to experience. 'Rising returns to
education' should be strictly meant in relative terms since even skilled
workers' employment and real wages decreased by two-digit percentages in
this period.
The second stage characterised by rising real wages for high-wage workers
and massive skilled job creation had rather different implications for the
relativities. While the skill premium of older workers failed to increase the
general devaluation of experience and the appreciation of new skills (rising
returns to education in young cohorts) got impetus and continued until
recently. The productivity equations of Section 4 provide part of the
explanation by suggesting a widening productivity gap between skilled-
and-young and skilled-and-old workers. Such a gap was first observed in
foreign-owned enterprises but appeared in the domestic sector, too, in later
stages of the transition.
The findings thus support the pessimistic (realistic) scenario of skills
obsolescence after the fall of state socialism. A more general lesson from
Hungary’s case is that Mincer-type earnings functions estimated without
interacting education and experience, and interpreted without an eye on
wage levels and employment, fail to uncover the true story. In early stages
of the transition one could observe a minor decline of returns to experience
and, more importantly, a major general increase in the value of school-
based skills irrespective of vintage. The estimates relating to this period
were driven by the collapse of demand for unskilled labour rather than
technological renewal or permanent systemic change, however. When new
technologies actually appeared and the demand for qualified workers
began to rise the 'appreciation of skills' was restricted to the younger
generation.7
2. THE EVOLUTION OF RELATIVE WAGES
Throughout the paper we apply three different specifications of earnings
regressions (see Table 1). The benchmark  Mincer-type specification
comprises the key variables (schooling and experience) as educational
grade dummies and linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic terms of
experience.
1 (Specification 1). Specification 2 applies an augmented
interactive model with group dummies for interactions of gender,
education and experience. Finally, we estimate a simplified interactive
earnings model (which interacts education and experience in a simplified
manner), where the key variables are defined exactly the same way as in
the underlying firm level productivity model (Specification 3).
Table 1.
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a  Occupational grade is not included as control.
b See Appendices for definitions and measurement.
We start with the benchmark regressions controlled for a large number of
wage determinants using data from 1986, 1989 and 1992-99. The
                                                          
1 We use higher than second order experience terms in order to be able to follow cohort
specific changes in the earnings profiles over time.8
regression estimates suggest a marked increase in the wage returns to
schooling, from the onset of transition. Figure 1, depicting the time paths
of returns to educational grades, suggests that wages relative to the primary
school grade grew by 25 per cent in the category of higher education, and
about 10 per cent in the case of secondary school background. The value of
apprentice-based vocational training did not change during the transition.
Most of these changes took place during the ‘transformational recession’
i.e. between 1989 and 1992/3. The rates of return to education seem to be
stabilised after 1993.









 college  secondary school
 vocational training school









Figure 1: Returns to schooling (base: primary school), 1986-99
(Specification 1)
The numbers presented in Figure 1 can be interpreted as lower bound
estimates of the "true" change in relative wages because the observed
earnings of the unskilled are upward biased by the sorting effect of
unemployment (Appendix 6).
The rise in return to formal education was accompanied by the devaluation
of market experience acquired under socialism. Changes in the rates of
return are measured by the formula  1 ˆ ˆ






2 1 exp * ˆ exp * ˆ exp * ˆ exp * ˆ ˆ β β β β + + + = y . The predicted change in the
returns to experience is plotted against the years of experience in Figure 2.
Panel  a suggests that the value of labour market experience slightly
increased in the last years of state socialism. The trend reversed in 1989
when experience started to lose its value, especially in older cohorts of the
labour force. The relative premium on 20 (or more) years of labour market9
experience dropped by 4 percent in 1989–92, and 7 percent between 1989
and 1999.
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(a) whole sample (b) separate equations by educational groups
Figure 2: Changes in the predicted returns to experience, 1986-99,
per cent (Specification 1)
As suggested by panel b of Figure 2 (separate equations for each
educational group), the obsolensence of experience-based skills was
stronger in the educated part of the labour force, with workers of university
or college background suffering the largest losses. A person with
university diploma and 15–25 years of experience lost about 20 percent of
his/her former experience-related wage premium.
Figure 2b calls the attention to the relevance of an interactive model which
allows for the fact that different educational and experience groups were
exposed to skills obsolescence to highly different degree. The interaction
effects are tested with an equation using 25 interactive dummies
2 of
education, experience and gender, treating unskilled labour (0-8 completed
classes irrespective of experience and gender) as the reference category. In
order to be able to control the gender division of the occupational
structure, and the profound gender differentials in the extent of specialized
                                                          
2 The interaction of gender, three educational (vocational training school, secondary
school, college) and four experience groups (0-5, 6-10, 11-20, 21-30 years of
experience) plus two categories as left overs: "old" workers (more than 30 years of
experience (without distinguishing by gender and schooling) and unskilled labour
(without distinguising by gender and experience). The latter category is the group of
reference in the regressions. In the augmented interactive model (Appendix 3) the
same controls  are used as in the benchmark specification (see Appendix 2)10
knowledge in the post-primary education
3, Figure 3 and its underlying
equation  reports the coefficients for males and females separately.
Regression parameters of the year 1986 are chosen as uniform (zero value)
starting points. Changes in wage returns relative to the 1986 values are
plotted in the graphs. Panels a-b repeat the results of the benchmark
Mincerian model by gender.
(i) The benchmark regression models (panels a-b) hint at the stabilisation
of returns to education following 1992/93, the worst years of the
transformation crisis. By contrast, the more precise interactive model
(panels c-h) reveals profound differences between  young and old cohorts.
The experience-related gap of the pre-transitional years (1986-89) was in
large part unaffected by 1992/93
4, and started to narrow rapidly after
1992/93, and even more markedly after 1995 when the first signs of
economic recovery became visible.
(ii) Workers with college or university background, both males and
females, improved their position across all experience groups but the value
of education increased at substantially higher rates in the young cohorts.
As a result, the experience-related wage gap between the oldest and the
youngest college cohorts decreased by 20-25 percent by 1999 (panels g-h).
Figure 3
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     (a) all experience groups, males      (b) all experience groups, females
(continue)
                                                          
3 As 1999 data show: the typical educational level for female workers is the general
secondary school (37 per cent as opposed to the 19 per cent of the vocational training
school). The opposite is true for male workers: most of them (42 per cent) have
vocational training school (as opposed to the 24 per cent who have general secondary
education).
4 Exceptions are female college graduates and workers with completed secondary
school. Even in these groups about the half of narrowing of the base years’
differential took place after 1992/93.11
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       (c) vocational training school, males    (d) vocational training school, females
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year
 exp.: 0-5 years  exp.: 6-10 years
 exp.: 11-20 years  exp.: 21-30 years











exp.: 0-5 years exp.: 6-10 years
 exp.: 11-20 years  exp.: 21-30 years










       (g) college, males     (h) college, females
Figure 3: Changes in returns relative to the 1986 returns:





86 β β β − = ∆ ,  (t  = 86, 89, 92-99, i = 1, ... , 24, 25),  i
representing 25 interactive dummies of education, experience and
gender.  Reference: unskilled labour: 0-8 completed classes,
irrespective of experience and gender (panels c-h), Specification
2. Other controls: see Appendix 312
(iii) The returns to secondary school increased in, and only in, the younger
cohorts of men and (particularly) women. The youngest female cohort
managed to improve its position by almost 20 percent, followed by
workers with 6-10 years of experience with a 15 percent increase, and
older females whose market skills kept their modest value without any
further appreciation. This kind of imbalance can be a sign of change in the
patterns of demand for non-manual female employees resulting from the
expansion of the tertiary sector.
(iv) Workers who completed vocational training school did not get ahead
in general (neither the females nor the males improved their position
relative to the reference category of unqualified workers) but the wages of
young skilled workers grew by about 10 percent compared to their older
counterparts. Again, we observe that the age-specific changes were taking
place after 1992.
(v) The relative shift in the position of the two youngest cohorts with
higher educational background (0-5 and 6-10 years of experience,
respectively) is particularly telling. The gap between these two cohorts was
5-8 percent (in terms of rise in returns) in the first years of transition
(1992-94). This diffential completely vanished by 1999 for males, and
even reversed for females. As the youngest cohort of the 1995 cross-
section (0-5 years of experience) and the second youngest one of 1999
(with 6-10 years of experience) graduated about the same time, in and right
after 1989. Those who graduated from college in 1989-94 was the first
cohort whose experience related returns were increasing over their life
cycle in the whole period of 1986-99. The increase of experience-related
returns indicate that new knowledge “behaves properly”: learning by doing
is rewarded increasingly when demand for new skills rises.
This observation can indicate that the the turning point in the story of
higher education in Hungary falls to the transitonal years when the quality
of education may have changed substantially. People who graduated by
and after 1989 were fortunate enough to receive a kind of education which
proved to be very useful in the market economy. This was not the case for
the other cohorts – and especially not for the older ones who graduated in
the sixties,  seventies and early eighties. The rise in return to their skills
stopped by 1992/93 as transitional crises was over and the market economy
(and the implied technological renewal) started to evolve at a full scale.13
3. THE BROADER CONTEXT: JOB DESTRUCTION AND JOB CREATION
Lessons from the interactive model demonstrate that the value of skills
rose between 1986 and 1992/93 in all experience groups, at almost the
same rate. However, in interpreting the general rise in returns to education
during the transformational recession one should consider the fact that
nearly all groups of the labour force lost in terms of both job opportunities
and real wages. The appreciation of skills should be meant in strictly
relative terms.
Though unevenly, real wages decreased by two digit percentages all along
the wage distribution, barring the 100
th percentile, in early years of the
transition. Low wage workers (10
th percentile) suffered a 30 per cent loss
in 1989-95 but the decline at the other end of the wage distribution was
large enough too (20 per cent in the 90
th
 percentile). Figure 4 gives the
percentage changes in net real wages by percentile over the 1989–1992,
1989–1995 and 1995–1999 periods.
As to the quantities, the time period of 1990–1995 witnessed large scale
job destruction, too. Workers with different skills were unevenly affected
but the available figures suggest net job destruction even in the skilled part
of the market. As much as 48 per cent of the unskilled jobs disappeared
between 1990–1995 but the market for skilled labour also had to face a 11
per cent contraction in that period.
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Figure 4: Percentage changes in net real earnings by percentiles in
1989-92, 1989-95, 1995-9914
Table 2
Employment by gender and education 1990, 1992, 1995, 1999
(thousand)
Male Female Total
unskilled skilled unskilled skilled unskilled skilled Year
1990 1,803 845 1,38 1,055 3,190 1,900
1992 1,358 860 929 936 2,287 1,864
1995 1,225 824 759 869 1,984 1,693
1999 1,228 875 702 1,006 1,930 1,881
Source: Central Statistical Office in: Fazekas (2000), pp. 247, 249. Skilled
stands for workers with secondary or higher educational background
The years of general decline were followed by an era of divergent
evolutions in 1995–1999. Skilled jobs were created in a similar magnitude
as had been destructed during the transition
5, and real wages in the upper
range of the wage distribution started to rise (Figure 4). This was not the
case with unskilled jobs. The number of unskilled jobs stagnated after
1995 and real wages decreased further in lower ranges of the wage
distribution.
With the passing of the transformational recession, which brought about
the collapse of demand for unskilled labour, substantial changes took place
in the evaluation of human capital. As shown in the previous section the
skill premium of older workers failed to increase further while the
appreciation of new skills got impetus and has continued until recently. In
the next section we present evidence suggesting that the widening gap
between the value of old and new skills are consistent with differences in
their relative productivity. These differences began to bear importance
when the market for skilled labour started to grow and new technologies
appeared in the economy.
Before engaging into a demand-side explanation we briefly address the
question if the observed trends in wage returns indicate deficiencies on the
supply side. This possibility can be ruled out on the basis of observed
(absolute) outflows from the educational system. As shown at Figure 5 the
marked rise in the value of new skills took place in a period when the
                                                          
5 The net skilled job creation rate was 11 per cent in 1995-1999.15
supply of skills increased considerably.
6 Though the inevitable
sluggishness of the supply-side response is part of the story, the
concomittant increase of wages and supply of young skilled workers leads
us to believe that the key is on the demand side.
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(a) graduation from vocational training
school and secondary school
 (b) College enrollments and graduations
Figure 5: Flows of the educational system, 1970–2000 (number of students)
4. ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITY
We present a simple model with the aim to test the hypothesis that changes
in technology and markets raised the productivity of younger educated
workers relative to other employees including older skilled employees. We
estimate productivity equations (derived from Cobb-Douglas production
functions with heterogeneous labour input) of the form:
                                 ∑ = + + + =
3
2 . log log log
i i i k l y ε γ β α                     (1)
y being firm level productivity (value added per worker), li the share of the
different types of skilled labour within the firm (skilled-young (l2) and
skilled-old (l3), the base category being the share of unskilled labor: l1)
7, k
                                                          
6 As the annual inflow of students to college increased sharply between 1994 and 1999
we can expect a further rise in supply in the 2000-2005 period.
7 “Skilled” means completed secondary school or incompleted or completed college or
university, “unskilled” means incompleted or completed primary or incompleted16
stands for the capital-labour ratio approximated with the net value of fixed
assets per worker. Parameters of particular interest are the productivity
elasticities with respect to l2 and l3, that is, the differences between skill
groups defined on the basis of educational background and experience.
8
The equations are estimated for a restricted sample of medium-sized and
large firms. Restriction is required because we shift from individual to
firm-level observations. Information on the internal composition of a firms'
labour force is available on the basis of a ten percent random sample of its
employees, so we have to restrict the attention to enterprises where the
number of workers in the Wage Survey is large enough.
9 Computations in
the restricted sample were weighted. Weights were defined as the ratio of
firms in the original and the resticted samples within groups formed by
firm size and ownership.
Figure 6 shows the time paths of the productivity yields attributed to
young and old skilled labour:
                            ) ( log / ) ( log ) ( t l t y t i i ∂ ∂ β = .                                    (2)
The results suggest that the changes in the skill-related wage differentials
at least partly reflect changes in relative productivity levels. The
productivity yield that is attributed by the model to young-skilled labour
input was rapidly growing in 1986–99 while the productivity of skilled-old
labour input was declining in 1992–99, to a point that in the latter year it
did not differ significantly from the productivity yield of unskilled labour
(that was chosen as the base category).
Before taking these first results as a proof let us examine the productivity
yields in more detail. If the appreciation of new skills is explained by the
efficient matching of new technologies and young workers one would
expect younger employees to be more productive and better paid in firms
applying advanced equipment and new work standards. Ideally, one would
like to study the experience-related differences in productivity and wages
                                                                                                                                                                         
secondary school. “Young” means experience less than the median experience, “old”
means median experience or more.
8 The functional form chosen for the productivity function assumes separability of
inputs which may be evaluated as a strong assumption. In a recent study (Kertesi and
Köllő 2001), estimating multi-factor demand models derived from the translog cost
function, using the same firm sample and the same definition of inputs, we got results
supportive of the conclusions drawn here.
9 This critical sample size on the level of a particular firm was 30 workers. By this
restriction practically all firms with less than 300 workers are excluded from the
analysis.17
by comparing a 'modern' and an 'obsolete' sector distinguished using firm-
level information. As a second best solution, since no enterprise-level
information is available on technology, and industrial branches are too
heterogeneous for a meaningful classification, we use foreign ownership to
proxy the 'modern sector'.
year
 skilled-young %  skilled-old %










Figure 6: Productivity elasticities of shares of different types of skilled
labour (relative to the unskilled labour), 1986–99.
Regression coefficients from equation 1 (page 10).
Dependent: log of value added per worker. See Appendix 5
Majority foreign-owned enterprises constitute a sizeable part of the
Hungarian economy: in 1999 they had 40.5 per cent share in employment,
51.2 per cent in fixed assets, 61.6 per cent in depreciation, 63.0 per cent in
value added and 78.6 per cent in exports (taking all firms in the Wage
Survey one hundred). Foreign-firm workers operate a relatively young
equipment of unusually high value, in a most productive environment
(Table 3). In addition they are required to adapt to the yet unfamiliar
western corporate culture, many of them are expected to speak foreign
languages, and undertake training courses repeatedly.
10 Exceptions do exist
(several foreign enterprises are known to have high demand for extended
worktime and maximum physical effort rather than novel skills) but there
                                                          
10 According to a recent survey comprising 264 domestic and 78 foreign-owned firms
the former spent 2.4 per cent of their total investment on training while the latter
spent 14.2 per cent in 2000. A difference of similar magnitude was observed in the
Czech Republic by Filer et al. (1995) For an introduction of the Hungarian survey see
EBRD (2000). The quoted figures have been calculated from the original data file.18
is hardly better choice than this if one looks for a representative of
'modernity' in the contemporary Hungarian economy.
Table 3.
Foreign and domestic firms in the sample of earnings model 3
 – Selected variables









1992 528 1,008 33.1 1,202 1,151 0.1n 0.113 0.132 1.2n
1993 769 1,540 63.5 1,889 2,524 2.3n 0.093 0.109 2.3n
1994 1,085 2,065 26.8 2,627 2,769 0.1n 0.085 0.119 20.4
1995 1,555 3,118 27.2 3,150 3,955 0.9n 0.096 0.131 16.7
1996 1,855 4,942 12.1 3,250 5,820 6.9 0.109 0.141 11.0
1997 2,804 6,022 25.2 4,815 7,804 7.4 0.115 0.149 19.5
1998 2,602 6,445 27.3 4,033 7,766 7.9 0.134 0.153 3.8
1999 3,368 7,529 28.6 6,308a 7,253 0.3n 0.151 0.181 6.4
a Three domestic firms reported extremely high capital/labour ratios (28 times the average) in
this year. If these firms are omitted the domestic mean becomes 4,410 and F=10.8.
b Firms reporting a rate higher than one excluded. The number of excluded firms: 1 in 1994, 2
in 1992, 3 in 1996 and 1999.
c Million Ft.
n Insignificant at the 0.05 level. The F-ratios test the equality of the means by one-way
analysis of variance.
Reestimating the productivity equation for domestic and foreign firms
separately yields the results presented at Figure 7. The estimates cover the
period 1992-99 during which the percentage of workers employed by
foreign firms rose from 10 per cent to 40 per cent.19
year
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        (a) foreign firms        (b) domestic firms
Figure 7:  Productivity elasticities of shares of different types of skilled
labour (relative to the unskilled labour) by ownership, 1992–99.
Regression coefficients from equation 1 (page 10).
Dependent: log of value added per worker. See Appendix 5
At domestic firms we observe that a higher share of skilled workers is
conducive to higher productivity but we find no difference related to the
shares of young-skilled and old-skilled labour until 1996. Moreover, the
productivity yields attributed to the young-skilled and the old-skilled were
stable over time, at least until 1996. By contrast majority foreign-owned
firms apparently acquire high productivity gains by employing young and
educated workers. In foreign firms the contribution of young-skilled
workers to the firm's productivity was markedly higher than that of older
cohorts throughout 1992–99. Higher shares of old-skilled labour increased
the productivity of a foreign firm in 1992 but the yields of this group were
continously decreasing and fell even below the level estimated for the base
category after 1996.
Foreign firms thus seem to play a leading role in the economy-wide rise of
productivity gains from young, educated workers. Taking into account the
widening productivity gap between young and old skilled labour in the
economy as a whole on the one hand, and the aforementioned ownership-
specific differentials on the other, one can conclude that the economy-wide
increase was a result of pure compositional change until 1996. Foreign
direct investment, and the more efficient matching of new technologies and
new skills in foreign than domestic enterprises, was the driving force
behind the appreciation of younger generations for half a decade.20
The returns to skills in domestic firms started to follow the foreign-firm
pattern only at the end of the nineties as shown by panel (b) of Figure 7:
during the three years between 1996 and 1999 the base differential in
productivity yields of the two types of skilled labour almost tripled
(growing from 0.14 to 0.40 by 1999).









 foreign skilled-old  domestic skilled-old
 foreign skilled-young  domestic skilled-young






Figure 8:  Wages at foreign and domestic firms.
See Appendix 4 for controls
The ownership-specific differentials in productivity are clearly reflected in
relative wages. Consistently with the predictions of the productivity model
young-skilled workers employed by foreign enterprises have higher wages
relative to their unskilled and skilled-old colleagues than have their
counterparts in domestic firms.
11
High demand for young, educated workers is also reflected by the age
composition of the labour force compared across sectors.
12 Foreign firms’
demand has been shifted towards the young cohorts since the times of the
first observations as shown by the panels of Figure 8. The size distribution
of experience cohorts compared across ownership were only slightly
different in 1992, as yet, with skilled workers having 3-10 years of
experience over-represented in foreign firms, but the equality of the
distributions can be definitely rejected in 1999. The bias for the young-
skilled is apparent from the shape of the curves.
                                                          
11 These results stem from the simplified interactive regression models presented by
Appendix 4.
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Figure 8: The distribution of experience cohorts in foreign
and domestic firms (1992, 1999)
Figure 8, however, calls the attention that the productivity advantage of
skilled-young workers employed by foreign firms may be partly a result of
a selection effect. Note that the demand shift towards the skilled-young did
not imply increased demand for school leavers. The cohorts heavily over-
represented in foreign enterprises are those with 3-10 years of work
experience – a fact we are inclined to interpret as a sort of free riding. By
employing skilled labour with some experience foreign firms may take
advantage of on-the-job training investments by domestic employers. (So
to say: they "skim the cream" of young skilled labour). Further research is
required to separate the productivity effect from the selection  effect.
6. CONCLUSION
The evolution of relative wages on the one hand, and of contributions to
productivity on the other, leads us to the conclusion that skills
obsolescence was, and still is, an important aspect of the post-communist
transition.
Like most of the studies of Central and Eastern Europe we found a general
rise in the returns to education between 1989 and 1992 when technological
change was minimal, and the forces of the market just started to work.
This, we believe, was nothing else but a mirror image of the collapse of22
demand for unskilled labour. When market institutions were already at
work, and modern technologies started to flow in, the general appreciation
of education stopped but the returns to experience continued to decline.
Technological renewal apparently contributed to the appreciation of young
and educated labour in this period. We found that these workers are paid
increasing wages and their skills actually worth more in a modern
environment. By contrast, neither productivity nor wages grew for the
older cohorts of educated workers after 1992.23
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APPENDIX 1: THE WAGE SURVEY
The analysis basically relies on cross-sectional regressions using data from
the National Labour Centre’s Wage Survey, waves 1986, 1989 and 1992-
99. The survey covers representative samples of firms employing 20 or
more workers (10 or more workers in 1995–99) and 10 percent random
samples of their workers. We restrict the analysis to workers in the
business sector by choice. The number of enterprises observed in the
survey grew from 4023 in 1986 to 13,585 in 1999. The number of
individual observations in the restricted samples varies between 86,000
and 116,000.
The cases are weighted to ensure representativity. An individual weight
(w1) stands for the number of workers represented by a respondent given
the sampling quota within his/her firm. An enterprise-level weight, added
by ourselves, is intented to correct the bias from firm-level non-response.
Comparing the composition of the target population and the sample by
firm size and two-digit industry we attached weights (w2) to each size-
industry cell. The compound weights (w1⋅ w2) restore representativity under
the assumption that non-response is uncorrelated with variables in the
calculations.
The variables observed on the level of individuals include gender, age,
level of education, occupation, and job grade. The firm-level variables
include two-digit industry, location, firm size, ownership, and standard
financial variables. Experience was approximated on the basis of age and
the level of education (age – years in school – 6). Unemployment was
measured at the Labour Office District level by dividing the number of
registered unemployed by the labour force in 1990.
The earnings figures we use comprise all work-related payments made by
the enterprise in May of the given year and 1/12 of the premia, bonuses
and rewards paid in the preceding year. The statistics refer to gross
earnings.26
Appendix 2:  Benchmark Mincerian earnings model
(1986-1999)
Dependent: log of gross monthly earnings
Independent variables 1986 1989 1992 1993 1994
Constant 8,0504 8,4343 8,9185 9,0968 9,1676
Gender:
  Male 0,2838 0,2995 0,2234 0,2317 0,2378
Schooling:
  Vocational training school 0,1203 0,1157 0,1339 0,1323 0,1288
  Secondary school 0,1359 0,1460 0,2197 0,2308 0,2194
  College 0,3592 0,4410 0,5597 0,5971 0,5981
Experience:
  Linear 0,0522 0,0514 0,0538 0,0482 0,0481
  Quadratic/100 -0,2187 -0,2034 -0,2554 -0,2226 -0,2285
  Cubic/10000 0,4654 0,4130 0,6259 0,5416 0,5760
  Quartic/1000000 -0,4149 -0,3579 -0,6000 -0,5182 -0,5569
Occupation:
  Non-manual 0,0957 0,1757 0,2218 0,2480 0,2451
  Managerial 0,5436 0,8700 0,7505 0,7039 0,8334
Productivity:
  log(value addded/worker) 0,0565 0,0808 0,1177 0,1615 0,1270
  Negative value added -0,0601 -0,0681 -0,1099 -0,0903 -0,1068
Capital/labor ratio:
  log(net fixed
assets/worker)
0,0350 0,0225 0,0200 0,0168 0,0131
Firm size: (# of workers)
  10 – 20 – – – – –
  21 – 50 -0,0005
n 0,0142
n -0,0546 -0,0669 -0,0382
  301 – 1000 0,0312 0,0478 0,0404 0,0582 0,1294
  1001 – 3000 0,0502 0,0764 0,0716 0,1059 0,1822
  3001 + 0,0772 0,0900 0,1294 0,1558 0,2318
Unemployment:
  log(unemployment rate) – – -0,0553 -0,0714 -0,0811
Industry:
  49 dummies, F-test 108,25 105,97 93,46 56,03 80,64
Region:
  15 dummies, F-test 131,47 152,39 57,39 35,78 30,5527
continue
N. of observations 116205 111293 86935 85833 94639
Adjusted R
2 0,4588 0,4639 0,5275 0,5058 0,5324
F– test 1033,11 881,07 940,88 825,08 898,97
Heteroscedasticity 710,19 1848,55 1574,00 1858,77 3702,04
Omitted variables 148,08 251,54 269,20 234,17 122,85
Normality of residuals 1579,83 3259,07 5397,33 7523,75 3833,55
   If not indicated otherwise: significant at 0,0001.
   * Significant at * 0,001     ** 0,05       
n  not significant.
   Notes: OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors.
   Base categories: women; 8 classes; manual workers; firms with 51-300 workers.28
Independent variables 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Constant 9,4365 9,5614 9,7322 9,7852 9,6720
Gender:
  Male 0,2196 0,2025 0,1929 0,1921 0,2088
Schooling:
  Vocational training school 0,1108 0,1303 0,1297 0,1220 0,1183
  Secondary school 0,1882 0,1999 0,2101 0,2154 0,2069
  College 0,5461 0,6004 0,6263 0,6342 0,6272
Experience:
  Linear 0,0454 0,0549 0,0593 0,0646 0,0636
  Quadratic/100 -0,2187 -0,3004 -0,3262 -0,3883 -0,3834
  Cubic/10000 0,5394 0,8134 0,8705 1,0912 1,0734
  Quartic/1000000 -0,4985 -0,8038 -0,8466 -1,1013 -1,0806
Occupation:
  Non-manual 0,2142 0,2389 0,2281 0,2334 0,2491




0,1698 0,2170 0,1962 0,2256 0,2301
  Negative value added – -0,0995 0,0319** 0,0543 0,1064
Capital/labor ratio:
  log(net fixed assets/worker) 0,0174 0,0058* 0,0243 0,0072 0,0068
Firm size: (# of workers)
  10 – 20 -0,2114 -0,2506 -0,2868 -0,2926 -0,2749
  21 – 50 -0,1142 -0,1408 -0,1692 -0,1808 -0,1901
  301 – 1000 0,0795 0,0784 0,0796 0,0981 0,1242
  1001 – 3000 0,1176 0,1085 0,1405 0,1710 0,1884
  3001 + 0,1673 0,1397 0,1202 0,1545 0,2179
Unemployment:
  log(unemployment rate) -0,0839 -0,0843 -0,0725 -0,0831 -0,0970
Industry:
  49 dummies, F-test 68,61 68,61 69,81 69,59 71,34
Region:
  15 dummies, F-test 15,13 15,13 16,27 18,90 14,9029
continue
N. of observations 90717 97918 88208 102102 102547
Adjusted R
2 0,5201 0,5472 0,5591 0,5710 0,5771
F– test 835,44 917,92 906,14 1192,02 1243,58
Heteroscedasticity 3551,24 5688,65 3435,75 4923,05 4894,68
Omitted variables 235,60 178,08 174,96 258,54 277,51
Normality of residuals 3547,12 3494,94 3515,77 3607,09 4534,56
   If not indicated otherwise: significant at 0,0001.
   * Significant at * 0,001     ** 0,05       
n  not significant.
   Notes: OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors.
   Base categories: women; 8 classes; manual workers; firms with 51-300 workers.30
Appendix 3:  Augmented interactive earnings model
(1986-1999)
Dependent: log of gross monthly earnings
Interactive variables
education experience (years) 1986 1989 1992 1993 1994
                     MALES
vocational 0–5 -0,1004 -0,1313 -0,1136 -0,0747 -0,0665
6–10 0,1031 0,1009 0,0909 0,0878 0,1169
11–20 0,2088 0,1984 0,1902 0,1951 0,1972
21–30 0,2581 0,2555 0,2498 0,2516 0,2492
secondary 0–5 -0,1384 -0,1456 -0,0681** -0,0469 -0,0422**
6–10 0,0997 0,0801 0,1218 0,1280 0,1270
11–20 0,2256 0,2285 0,2655 0,2846 0,2635
21–30 0,3300 0,3448 0,3607 0,3699 0,3600
college 0–5 -0,0112
n 0,0454*** 0,1572 0,2406 0,2295
6–10 0,2553 0,2676 0,3834 0,4528 0,4390
11–20 0,4315 0,4766 0,5579 0,5519 0,5619
21–30 0,5305 0,6014 0,6696 0,6886 0,6894
                     FEMALES
vocational 0–5 -0,2351 -0,2615 -0,2085 -0,1969 -0,2339
6–10 -0,1433 -0,1682 -0,1112 -0,1244 -0,1719
11–20 -0,0756 -0,1049 -0,0583 -0,0677 -0,0900
21–30 0,0078
n -0,0198
n 0,0249** 0,0263** 0,0015
n
secondary 0–5 -0,3709 -0,3900 -0,2374 -0,2243 -0,2432
6–10 -0,2080 -0,2571 -0,1052 -0,0997 -0,1215
11–20 -0,0685 -0,0983 -0,0174** -0,0168*** -0,0344
21–30 0,0805 0,0598 0,1224 0,1290 0,0899
college 0–5 -0,0698 -0,0927 0,1834 0,2101 0,1894
6–10 0,1155 0,1855 0,2896 0,3424 0,3419
11–20 0,2808 0,3570 0,4373 0,4980 0,4539
21–30 0,4246 0,4782 0,5436 0,6070 0,6159
male & female, experience > 30 0,2892 0,2879 0,3135 0,3200 0,340331
continue
N. of observations 116205 111293 86935 85833 94639
Adjusted R
2 0,3647 0,3998 0,5023 0,4802 0,5106
F– test 649,39 576,21 617,41 616,97 696,18
Heteroscedasticity 187,12 1234,89 1448,51 1628,16 3481,45
Omitted variables 52,10 129,37 159,93 185,28 80,83
   If not indicated otherwise: significant at 0,0001.
   * Significant at * 0,001    ** 0,01     *** 0,05      
+ 0,1        
n  not significant.
   Notes: OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors.
   Base category: Education = primary (or less), irrespective to gender and experience   
   Controls: same as in the benchmark Mincerian model (see Appendix 2)32
Interactive variables
education experience (years) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
                    MALES
vocational 0–5 -0,0745 -0,0605 -0,0577 -0,0559 -0,0432
6–10 0,0771 0,0713 0,0564 0,0816 0,0808
11–20 0,1597 0,1663 0,1674 0,1668 0,1716
21–30 0,2199 0,2309 0,2353 0,2292 0,2251
secondary 0–5 -0,0788 -0,0893 -0,0816 -0,0622*** -0,0306
6–10 0,1060 0,1159 0,1087 0,1159 0,1287
11–20 0,2233 0,2291 0,2361 0,2507 0,2600
21–30 0,3217 0,3205 0,3301 0,3275 0,3309
college 0–5 0,1785 0,1956 0,2748 0,2775 0,3072
6–10 0,4097 0,4736 0,5312 0,5273 0,5777
11–20 0,5130 0,5564 0,5750 0,6220 0,6214
21–30 0,6238 0,6317 0,6691 0,6511 0,6842
                      FEMALES
vocational 0–5 -0,1985 -0,1803 -0,1607 -0,1513 -0,1351
6–10 -0,1142 -0,1184 -0,1014 -0,1065 -0,0716







secondary 0–5 -0,2363 -0,2397 -0,2282 -0,1879 -0,1857
6–10 -0,1231 -0,0982 -0,0693 -0,0540 -0,0587
11–20 -0,0454 -0,0556 -0,0190
+ -0,0268* -0,0345
21–30 0,0592 0,0783 0,0934 0,0977 0,0815
college 0–5 0,2001 0,1725 0,2182 0,2345 0,2299
6–10 0,3774 0,3679 0,4161 0,4646 0,4584
11–20 0,4149 0,4348 0,4513 0,5025 0,4735
21–30 0,4988 0,5634 0,5942 0,5546 0,5268
male & female, experience > 30 0,2997 0,3061 0,3057 0,2907 0,2817
N. of observations 90717 97918 88208 102102 102547
Adjusted R
2 0,4999 0,5303 0,5445 0,5570 0,5622
F– test 651,44 716,36 737,18 948,85 1006,96
Heteroscedasticity 3474,02 5645,25 3357,66 4934,77 4909,06
Omitted variables 182,43 138,21 156,04 237,19 236,07
   If not indicated otherwise: significant at 0,0001.
   * Significant at * 0,001   ** 0,01    *** 0,05      
+ 0,1       
n  not significant.
   Notes: OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors.
   Base category: Education = primary (or less), irrespective to gender and experience   
   Controls: same as in the benchmark Mincerian model (see Appendix 2)33
Appendix 4:  Simplified interactive earnings model
(1992-1999)
Dependent: log of gross monthly earnings
     DOMESTIC FIRMS
Interactive variables 1992 1993 1994 1995
skilled-young 0,2675 0,2707 0,3170 0,2641
skilled-old 0,5053 0,5036 0,5586 0,4919
N. of observations 81301 75791 82768 65754
Adjusted R
2 0,3927 0,3872 0,3811 0,3573
Mean ln(monthly wage) 9,8293 9,9952 10,2428 10,3331
Interactive variables 1996 1997 1998 1999
skilled-young 0,2517 0,2307 0,2613 0,2579
skilled-old 0,4888 0,4714 0,4959 0,4796
N. of observations 77733 68013 75415 75321
Adjusted R
2 0,4031 0,4401 0,4424 0,4277
Mean ln(monthly wage) 10,5108 10,6838 10,8141 10,9606
     FOREIGN FIRMS
Interactive variables 1992 1993 1994 1995
skilled-young 0,3753 0,3543 0,3745 0,3382
skilled-old 0,5089 0,4919 0,5422 0,4849
N. of observations 5493 9815 11490 24650
Adjusted R
2 0,3992 0,4004 0,3919 0,3952
Mean ln(monthly wage) 10,0673 10,2099 10,4685 10,6292
Interactive variables 1996 1997 1998 1999
skilled-young 0,3385 0,3363 0,3496 0,3361
skilled-old 0,5032 0,4968 0,4723 0,4307
N. of observations 19814 20195 26687 27226
Adjusted R
2 0,4196 0,4092 0,4435 0,4627
Mean ln(monthly wage) 10,8283 11,0455 11,2282 11,3634
Significant at 0,0001.
Notes: OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors
Skilled young: secondary or college, less than 22 years of experience
Skilled old: secondary or college, 22 years of experience or more
Base category: Education = primary (or less), irrespective to experience
Controls: as in the benchmark Mincerian model (see Appendix 2) except
occupational groups.34
Appendix 5:  Productivity model (page 11)
(1986-1999)
Dependent: log value added per worker
ALL FIRMS
Independent variables 1986 1989 1992 1993 1994
Constant -2.2069 -1,5558 -1,2928 -1,2463 -1,3857
log share of skilled-young
a 0,2418 0,1591 0,1894 0,2180 0,4025
log share of skilled-old




c 0,1822 0,2428 0,2145 0,1833 0,1354
N. of firms 971 748 600 567 506
Adjusted R
2 0,2111 0,2170 0,1241 0,1736 0,2341
Independent variables 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Constant –0,8274 –0,4725* -0,4975** -0,5156* -0,6403
n
log share of skilled-young
a 0,2510 0,3227 0,3441 0,4385 0,5442







c 0,2545 0,2834 0,3417 0,2897 0,3296
N. of firms 470 477 400 476 445
Adjusted R
2 0,2666 0,3419 0,3665 0,4045 0,4069
If not indicated otherwise: significant at 0,0001.
Significant at * 0,01  ** 0,05    
n not significant.
a Skilled-young: secondary or college, less than 22 years of experience
b Skilled-old: secondary or college, 22 years of experience or more
c Capital/ labour ratio: net value of fixed assets per worker35
Dependent: log value added per worker
DOMESTIC FIRMS
Independent variables 1992 1993 1994 1995
Constant –1,2976 –1,2451 –1,4589 –0,9548
log share of skilled-young
a 0,1658* 0,1405* 0,3346 0,1157***





c 0,1982 0,1502 0,1040 0,1887
N. of firms 543 478 420 312
Adjusted R
2 0,1104 0,1324 0,2071 0,1777
Independent variables 1996 1997 1998 1999
Constant –0,6556 –0,6073* –0,6085 –0,6675
n
log share of skilled-young
a 0,2431 0,2492 0,3103 0,3797






c 0,2257 0,2756 0,2121 0,2481
N. of firms 345 276 310 272
Adjusted R
2 0,2923 0,3160 0,3518 0,3126
FOREIGN FIRMS
Independent variables 1992 1993 1994 1995
Constant –1,7159 –1,8830 –1,5904* –0,8008*
log share of skilled-young
a 0,4548* 0,5979 0,6069 0,3721








n 0,1874 0,3077 0,2397*
N. of firms 57 89 86 158
Adjusted R
2 0,2601 0,4876 0,3612 0,3607






log share of skilled-young
a 0,3946 0,3015* 0,4657 0,4817*







c 0,3424 0,3961 0,3517 0,4197
N. of firms 132 124 166 173
Adjusted R
2 0,3881 0,3245 0,3390 0,3605
If not indicated otherwise: significant at 0,0001.
Significant at * 0,01  ** 0,05  *** 0,1    
n not significant.
a Skilled-young: secondary or college, less than 22 years of experience
b Skilled-old: secondary or college, 22 years of experience or more
c Capital/ labour ratio: net value of fixed assets per worker36
Appendix 6: Selectivity correction
Comparisons of wages before and after the transition are subject to
selectivity bias because the people sorted out of the labor market are not
randomly selected. For lack of suitable data the standard Heckman
technique of selectivity-bias corrected wage regressions was not available
for us. As the standard source of employment data, the Hungarian Labour
Force Survey does not observe wages there is no way to ascertain how the
wage distribution is affected by the selection of wage earners. We used an
alternative, and admittedly second-best, solution to account for selection
bias. Using two consecutive waves of the Labour Force Survey from 1993,
when unemployment was at its peak, we estimated the determinants of
individual job loss. As a dependent variable we used a dummy reporting
whether the person who was employed in the first quarter of 1993 managed
to keep his/her job in the next quarter (1 = no, 0 = yes). The independent
variables were gender, age, schooling, occupation and residence. We used
the parameters of the equation for predicting  individual  risks in the
samples of employees observed in the Wage Surveys. The distribution of
workers by the predicted individual risks were compared for subsequent
points in time and for different groups of workers. In case we observed a
decrease in the average predicted risk of a group and a simultaneous
increase in its relative wage we considered selectivity bias as a potential
underlying reason. (A decrease of the average risk means that workers with
a high risk of jobloss, or with high reservation wages, are sorted out of
employment and this may lead to an increase of observed wages). Crude as
it is, this procedure calls the attention to groups where the bias from self-
selection is potentially strong.
In the particular case when we estimated wage returns to education, the
average risk of job loss for those people with completed or incompleted
primary school decreased from 9 percent to 8 percent. This indicates that
from the uneducated group many high-risk workers left the market by the
end of the transition. We conducted our elementary selection bias test
when we estimated the experience related returns, too. As the age-specific
(or experience-specific) mean values of the risk of job loss do not differ
statistically we conclude that the devaluation of labour market experience
is real, not a statistical artifact resulting from market sorting.